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1 Introduction
International migration is one of the most debated phenomena of the globalization era. Accord-
ing to World Bank (2011), in 2010 about 3 percent of the worlds population lives outside their
countries of origin, many of whom moved from low-developed countries. In the developed world
international migration is perceived both as a great opportunity for long-run growth as well as a
serious threat for social cohesion because of the competition in the labor market. The trade-o¤
between costs and benets of migration is one of the most hotly debated issue in industrialized
countries, especially in those where the fact of being a host country rather than a source country
is a novelty not well understood by public opinion.
In spite of the importance of the issue, few papers have addressed this issue at a general
equilibrium level, many of which focusing on illegal migration. These studies include Rodriguez
(1975), Braun (1993), Meier and Wenig (1997), Kemnitz and Wigger (2000), Hazari and Sgro
(2003), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Moy and Yip (2006), Palivos and Yip (2007), Palivos
(2009), Liu (2010), Chassamboulli and Pavilos (2010), Palivos et al. (2011). The main limitation
of these papers is that they address migration issues by using a closed economy framework.1
This paper analyzes the dynamic behavior of a small open economy with international mi-
gration. In doing so, we present a small open economy with capital adjustment costs, where two
groups of workers - domestic workers and foreign (or immigrant) workers - enter as complement
inputs in the production system. Since the domestic economy is small in comparison with the
rest of the world, its economic dynamics cannot alter the world interest rates. This causes
capital accumulation to react to external rather internal stimuli, with the result that changes in
the composition of the domestic workforce can a¤ect the macroeconomic equilibria in di¤erent
ways from those predicted by the current literature.
The paper can be ideally split into two parts. The rst part of the paper focuses on perfect
world capital markets, in which natives can lend and borrow as much as they want without
restrictions. We conduct our analysis at both an analytical and numerical level and show that
the model displays a continuum of converging paths, each depending on the initial level of
the immigration ratio - dened as the number of immigrants per native resident. Since the
steady state is indeterminate, to analyze the dynamic properties of the model we perform three
di¤erent numerical exercises by parametrizing three di¤erent scenarios depending on whether
the initial immigration ratio is equal, larger or lower than its long-run value. We nd that
changes in the initial level of the immigration ratio can permanently a¤ect the long-run level
of both domestic consumption and national debt per native, while they have only temporary
e¤ects on the remaining macroeconomic variables of the model. In particular, we nd that the
higher the immigration ratio, the higher the level of domestic consumption and the lower the
level of the stock of foreign bonds per native worker.
To check whether indeterminacy depends on the absence of borrowing constraints, in the
1The only exceptions are the papers by Galor (1986) and Chen (2006), in which international migration is
plugged into a two-country framework with overlapping generations, and Palivos and Yip (2007), who provide
an extension of their Solow-like model to the case of a small open economy.
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second part of the paper we extend the basic model to the case in which the domestic economy
faces an upward-sloping curve of debt. Due to the complexity of the model, we resort to
numerical simulations in order to study the transitional dynamics of the domestic economy.
We nd that for very plausible parameters the indeterminacy result is robust to changes in
the world capital markets regime. However, in contrast to the previous case of perfect world
capital markets, we nd that changes in the initial level of the immigration ratio have only
temporary e¤ects on the main macroeconomic variable of the model. Specically, we nd that
changes in the initial value of the immigration ratio have only temporary a¤ect the long-run
level of domestic consumption, national debt per native and capital accumulation, because of
the dynamic adjustment of the interest rate.
Finally, in order to check whether the competitive equilibrium is also socially e¢ cient,
the paper presents a welfare analysis in which we contrast the steady-state results of the ba-
sic/decentralized economy with those of a centrally-planned one in which a benevolent social
planner maximizes the welfare of natives. We nd that in competitive equilibrium the domestic
economy overaccumulates capital and overattracts immigrants. This result occurs because na-
tives do not take into account the impact that their investment decisions have on the wage bill
of immigrants. Consequently, in order to establish the rst best, the government can pursue
two alternative policies: taxing capital earnings or introducing an immigration tax. However,
we nd the only policy that is e¤ective in establishing the rst best is tax capital earnings.
With respect to the closed-economy literature of international migration and macroeconomic
dynamics, which predicts that the steady-state equilibrium is always saddle-path stable, our
results represent a novelty. In contrast with this literature, in the present model the existence
of a continuum of stable arms has several dynamic implications for the model. In particular,
the presence of local indeterminacy implies that: (i) while the transitional growth rates of the
domestic economy are indeterminate, the long-run growth is not and is equal to zero in the
steady state; (ii) structurally identical economies can exhibit convergence patterns towards the
unique steady-state equilibrium if their initial immigration ratio is not the same.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model economy in the case of perfect
world capital markets and analyzes its steady-state properties as well as its dynamic properties.
Section 3 extends the basic model to the case of an upward-sloping curve of debt and checks
whether indeterminacy is likely to disappear for a set of plausible parameters representing a
small open economy. Section 4 investigates the e¤ects of migration on the welfare of natives.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the results and draws conclusions.
2 The model economy without borrowing restrictions
2.1 Overview of the model
We begin by describing the generic structure of a small open economy that consumes and pro-
duces a single traded commodity (henceforth domestic output). At all points in time, population
L consists of N natives and M immigrants, each of whom has an innite planning horizon and
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possesses perfect foresight. Regardless of their nationality, each individual is endowed with a
unit of labor which is supplied inelastically in exchange for a wage. We abstract from unemploy-
ment issues, so that at any point in time total labor supply is equal to the resident population,
L.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the native population is constant over time, whereas
the foreign population might change according to a migration function whose characteristics
will be described later in the paper. Once foreign workers have emigrated, they enter the labor
market of the host country and try to nd a job in competition with natives. Following the
literature on illegal migration and growth, we assume that only natives are allowed to save,
while immigrants are assumed to spend all their wages in consumption.
The domestic capital market is fully integrated into the world capital markets, which channel
the national saving towards nancial assets. There are two nancial assets available to native
savers: foreign bonds and capital assets. When accumulating capital assets though, we assume
that savers bear installation costs à la Hayashi (1982). This is to prevent the domestic capital
stock from instantaneously reaching its long-run level at an innite speed of convergence.
Production is carried out by a fringe of competitive rms. The nancing of domestic pro-
duction can occur through both domestic and foreign saving. To start with, we suppose that
the domestic economy has no borrowing restrictions, meaning that it can lend or borrow as
much as it likes at a given interest rate. In Section 3 we remove this simplifying assumption by
extending the basic model to the case of a small open economy with borrowing constraints.
2.2 Consumption
Aggregate consumption is denoted by C = Cn + Cm, so that the consumption expenditure per
native is given by c  Cn=N and consumption expenditure per immigrant is given by cm 
Cm=M . Immigrants are supposed to consume all their income without saving or borrowing,
such that at all points in time the overall wage bill paid to immigrants, wm, is equal to their
consumption, Cm; in formulas: Cm = wmM . This means that immigrants do not make any
nancial e¤ort to help the domestic economy to accumulate capital.2
Natives are endowed by a felicity function, u (c), satisfying the usual neoclassical properties:
u (0) = 0, u0 (c) > 0, u00 (c) < 0 and Inada (1963) conditions. The lifetime utility of the
representative native is therefore given by:
U (t) =
Z 1
0
e tu (c) dt; (1)
where  > 0 is the subjective discount rate.
In contrast with immigrants, natives accumulate two types of assets: capital and foreign
bonds. To accumulate capital, natives invest a positive amount of output, denoted by i, in
2We make this assumption for simplicity. An alternative assumption would be that of allowing immigrants to
save a share of their current wage, smwm (with sm 2 (0; 1)) and then send it back to their own country of origin
through workersremittances. However, this assumption, although it modies the level of the current account,
does not a¤ect the capital accumulation pattern of the domestic economy and adds no further insight to the main
results of the model.
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capital investment and bear installation (or adjustment) costs given by:
 (i; k)  i

1 +
h
2

i
k

: (2)
Equation (2) is an application of the familiar Hayashi (1982) installation costs framework,
where h > 0 measures the sensitivity of the adjustment costs to changes in the total amount
invested. It turns out to have at least two important roles in the present model. First, (2)
precludes the existence of an innite speed of convergence of the capital stock. Second, it
introduces a new endogenous variable, the so-called Tobins q after Brainard and Tobin (1968),
which equilibrates the rates of return on the two nancial assets available to the domestic
economy. Given (2), the net rate of capital accumulation is given by:
_k = i  k; (3)
where  2 (0; 1) captures the depreciation rate of the installed capital stock.
Natives also accumulate foreign bonds, B, which pay a xed rate of return, r. Since the
domestic economy has unrestricted access to perfect world capital markets, the di¤erential
equation governing the accumulation of foreign bonds is given by:
_b = rb+ wn + rkk   c   (i; k) : (4)
where b  B=N and k  K=N are, respectively, the stock of foreign bonds and the stock of
capital assets per native, wn is the wage bill paid to natives and rk is the rate of return on
capital assets.
Nativesdecisions are to choose their rates of consumption, c, per capita investment, i, and
asset accumulation, b and k, to maximize the lifetime utility (1), subject to the two accumulation
equations (3) and (4), and capital adjustment costs (2).
2.2.1 Optimality conditions and Tobins q
Lets dene the shadow value of wealth in the form of internationally traded bonds by  and
the shadow value of wealth in the form of installed capital by q0. The discounted Hamiltonian
for this dynamic optimization is:
H = e tu (c) + 

rb+ wn + rkk   c  i

1 +
h
2
i
k

+ q0 (i  k) :
where we use (2) to substitute for  (i; k).
Consumption per native, c, and investment, i, are control variables, while the capital per
domestic worker, k, and foreign bonds, b, are state variables. By using  as numéraire, it
is possible to write the problem in terms of a new co-state variable, q  q0=, which can be
interpreted as the relative shadow price of the installed capital in terms of the (unitary) price
of foreign bonds. The rst order conditions with respect to c, i, b and k are given by:
e tu0 (c)   = 0 (5)
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 

1 + h
i
k

+ q = 0 (6)
r =  
_

(7)
rk
q
+
h
2q

i
k
2
  (r + ) =   _q
q
: (8)
Equation (5) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow value of wealth in
the form of foreign bonds, . Equation (6) equates the marginal cost of an additional unit of
investment in foreign bonds to the relative market value of capital, q. It may be re-arranged to
yield:
i = k

q   1
h

: (9)
According to (9), the critical determinant of capital investment is the relative shadow price
of the installed capital, q, the path of which is yet to be determined. Equation (7) is the
standard KeynesRamsey consumption rule, equating the marginal return on consumption to
the growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption. With r being constant, (7) implies a
constant growth rate of marginal utility, . Equation (8) is the arbitrage condition between
foreign bonds and domestic capital assets. Using (9) to substitute for the i=k ratio, it can be
rewritten as follows:
rk
q
+
_q
q
+
(q   1)2
2hq
= r + : (10)
According to (10), at any point in time natives equate the rate of return on capital assets
- left-hand side of (10) - to the rate of return on foreign bonds plus the rate of depreciation -
right-hand side of (10). The rate of return on capital assets has three components. The rst
component is the rate of return of installed capital valued at the relative price q. The second,
is the rate of capital gain. Finally, the third component measures the marginal reduction
in adjustment costs valued at the relative price q. This component reects the fact that an
additional source of benet from higher capital stock is a reduction in the installation costs
associated with new investment.
Finally, the following pair of transversality conditions ensure that natives cannot increase
their stock of capital or their stock of foreign bonds indenitely:
lim
t!1 q
0k = 0 (11)
lim
t!1b = 0: (12)
This completes the description of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for this utility
maximization problem.
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2.2.2 The domestic consumption function
At all points in time, domestic consumption is given by Cn = cN . Taking time derivative and
using (5) and (7) yields:
_Cn
Cn
=
_c
c
=  1 (r   )  gc: (13)
where   u0 (c) c=u00 (c) is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
According to (13), domestic consumption grows at a constant rate, gc, which is determined by
the taste parameters,  and , and the exogenous rate of return on foreign bonds r. As the level
of the interest rate is completely unrelated to the level of capitalization in the domestic economy,
access to perfect world capital markets dichotomizes the dynamics of the model, implying that
the time evolution of domestic consumption is totally independent of that of production. Indeed,
by solving (13) forwardly, it is easy to verify that the time path of consumption per native does
not show links with the production side of the economy and is given by:
c (t) = c (0) egct; (14)
where the initial level of consumption, c (0), will be determined later in the paper in accordance
with the national solvency condition.
2.3 Production
The production side of the domestic economy consists of a continuum of perfectly competitive
rms, whose total size is normalized to unity. At the aggregate level, the domestic output, Y , is
determined by the aggregate capital stock, K, domestic workers, N , and foreign workers M . In
order to accommodate growth under more general assumptions, we assume that the production
technology available to all rms is of the CobbDouglas type and reads:
Y = AKMN1   with 0 < +  < 1,
where A > 0 is a scale parameter measuring the level of technology.
Let m M=N be the immigration ratio. The linear homogeneity of the production function
allows us to write:
y = Akm , (15)
where y  Y=N denotes the output per native. Perfect competition in the output market
implies that all the production inputs are paid at their marginal cost. Consequently, prot
maximization conditions read:
rk =
@Y
@K
= Ak 1m (16)
wn =
@Y
@N
= (1    )Akm (17)
wm =
@Y
@M
= Akm 1. (18)
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It is worth noticing that, according to (17), natives and immigrants are (Edgeworth) com-
plements in production. Indeed, by di¤erentiating (17) with respect to m, it is easy to verify
that an increase in the immigration ratio raises the wage rate of natives.3 This result stems
from the fact that both domestic and foreign labor are essential inputs in production, which is
a standard assumption for neoclassical growth theory.4
2.4 The current account dynamics
As mentioned above, only natives are allowed to trade in foreign bonds. Consequently, by
aggregating (4) over the N natives and using (16), (17) and (9) to substitute for rk, wn and i,
the time evolution of the current account of the domestic economy is described by:
_B = rB + (1  )AN km   Cn  K

q2   1
2h

: (19)
Equation (19) states that the rate at which the domestic economy accumulates foreign
bonds equals the interest it is earning on their capital account rB; plus its net export, NX =
Y   C   I (1 + hI=2K).5 As is usual for small open economy models, in the remainder of the
paper we focus on the special case of r = , according to which the internationally given interest
rate is stationary and equal to the subjective discount rate of the native residents.
2.5 The migration function
In this section we introduce the migration function. In doing so, we assume that the choice of
emigrating or not emigrating is assumed to depend on only the existence of a positive di¤erential
3As Borjas (2000) points out, the impact on the wage rate of native residents of a permanent increase in the
size of the immigrant workforce depends on whether immigrants and natives are complements or substitutes in
production. More specically, if immigrants and natives are complements, then a more intensive use of immigrant
workers leads to a permanent increase in the wage bill paid to natives. On the contrary, if the two groups are
substitutes, then a more intensive use of immigrant workers leads to a permanent decrease in the wage bill paid
to natives.
4The bulk of literature on illegal migration and neoclassical growth is prone to consider domestic and foreign
workers as perfect substitutes in production rather than complements. This paper, instead, focuses on the case in
which domestic and foreign labor are essential inputs in production, with the result that natives and immigrants
are "Edgeworth" complements in production. Such a property of the production function makes it hard to
consider illegal something that is necessary, even crucial, for the existence of the whole economy. As a result,
in the remainder of the paper immigration is always a legal phenomenon, leaving the analysis of the alternative
case in which domestic and foreign workers are substitutes to future research.
5The national resource constraint requires Y = C + I (1 + hI=2K) + NX. Using (15) and (9) to get rid
of Y and I yields: NX = AN km   C   K q2   1 =2h. At each instant t, aggregate consumption equals
C = cN + cMM = N [c+ wmm]. Therefore, using (18) to substitute for wm obtains:
NX = (1  )AN Akm   cN   kN   q2   1 =2h:
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between the wage rate currently paid in the domestic economy, wm, and a reference wage
currently paid in the country of origin, w. For any given value of the reference wage, w,
migration towards the domestic country occurs if and only if the current wage bill paid to
immigrants is larger than w - i.e. wm   w > 0. Likewise, migration towards the domestic
country ceases if the current wage rate paid to immigrants is equal to the reference wage - i.e.
wm   w = 0 -, and eventually inverts direction if the wage rate o¤ered in the home country is
larger than that paid in the domestic economy - i.e. wm   w < 0.
By using (18) to substitute for wm, the ow of people in and out of the domestic economy
is governed by the following di¤erential equation:
_M = 

Akm 1   w

M , (20)
where  > 0 is an exogenous parameter capturing the sensitivity of migration to changes in
wage di¤erentials.6
Note that the presence of the immigration ratio, m, into the right-hand side of (20) stops
people from abandoning the country of origin and catastrophically ow towards the domestic
country. Obviously, this is not the only way to prevent people from emigrating catastrophically
to the domestic country. Braun (1993), for instance, introduces diminishing returns to scale into
the domestic economy by assuming that an increase in population congests a natural resource.
Since all residents of the domestic economy - both natives and immigrants - have free access to
this natural resource, in Brauns model the world economy does not depopulate in the steady
state because, from a given point in time on, some foreign individuals will not nd it convenient
to move to the domestic economy because of congestion.7 Similarly, in the present model
smoothly-decreasing marginal products play a similar role and prevent people from completely
depopulating their native soil.
2.6 The dynamic equilibrium
2.6.1 Characterization of the equilibrium and steady-state analysis.
A competitive equilibrium for this small open economy can be characterized as follows:
Denition 1: Suppose the internationally given interest rate, r, is stationary and equal
to the subjective discount rate of natives, . For any pair of initial conditions, fk (0) ; b (0)g,
a competitive equilibrium for this dynamic small open economy is given by a set of time paths
for the endogenous variables, fc (t) ; k (t) ; q (t) ;m (t) ; b (t)gt2(0;1), a set of time paths for wages,
fwn (t) ; wm (t)gt2(0;1) ; and a time path for the rate of return on the installed capital frk (t)gt2(0;1),
such that:
1. natives maximize their discounted utility function (1) subject to the two accumulation con-
straints (3) and (4), the installation cost function (2) and the two transversality conditions
(11) and (12);
6Note that in this paper  = 0 is not allowed because of the essentiality property of the production function.
7See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Ch.9) for technical details.
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2. rms maximize prots subject to the technology constraint (15);
3. people migrate either in or out of the domestic economy according to the migration function
(20).
Based on (14), if r =  holds, then consumption per native is always constant over time and
equal to c (0). Thus, to completely describe the dynamics of the production side of the domestic
economy it is necessary to consider the evolution of the capital stock, k, together with those of
the relative shadow price of the installed capital, q, and the immigration ratio, m. To get these
paths, we resort to equations (3), (10), and (20), which comprise, together with the investment
function (9) and the consumption path (14), a closed-form solution for the model.
Using (9), (16), and (18) to get rid of i, rk and wm, the dynamics of the model are fully
described by the following system of non-linear di¤erential equations:
_k = k

q   1
h

  k (21)
_q = (+ ) q   (q   1)
2
2h
  Ak 1m (22)
_m = 
h
Akm 1   w
i
m (23)
where, in order to obtain the dynamic equation (23), we used _m=m = _M=M .8
System (21)-(23) comprises a triple of dynamic equations in k, q, and m, that evolve inde-
pendently of the consumption expenditure of natives and the current account. In the system,
k is a predetermined variable, while both q and m are jump (or non-predetermined) variables.
The reason why we consider m as a jump variable is simple and draws on the denition of
a non-predetermined variable.9 As pointed out earlier, foreign workers decide to migrate or
not migrate depending on whether the wage rate o¤ered by domestic rms, wm, is higher than
the reference wage, w0. This makes the ow of immigrants a forward-looking variable, whose
time behavior depends on whether individuals are able to correctly anticipate the time path
of wm. This implies that the immigration ratio, m, can instantaneously respond to changes in
expectations due to changes in wage di¤erentials between countries.
For both the capital stock and the immigration ratio to be constant over time, system (21)-
(23) must have at least one rest point, attained when _k = _q = _m = 0. In the rest point,
the domestic economy is said to be in a steady-state equilibrium, whose main properties are
summarized as follows
Denition 2: Suppose the internationally given interest rate, r, is stationary and equal to
the subjective discount rate of natives, . A steady state for the domestic economy consists of a
vector fk; q;mg satisfying condition _k = _q = _m = 0.
8 Indeed, log-di¤erentiating m  M=N with respect to t gives _m =

_M=M   _N=N

m. As the native popu-
lation is stationary and _N = 0, this equation becomes: _m=m = _M=M . Finally, using (20) to substitute for _M
yields (23).
9For a better description of the distinction between predetermined and non-predetermined variables see, among
others, Buiter (1982).
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System (21)-(23) is block recursive. From (21) the steady-state relative shadow price of the
installed capital is easily obtained and equal to:
q = 1 + h: (24)
Equation (24) shows that q exceeds 1 because adjustment costs are borne in the steady
state for the gross investment to replace the capital worn out because of depreciation. Having
determined q from this equation, the steady-state stock of capital per native worker, k, and
the steady-state immigration ratio, m, are determined simultaneously from (22)-(23) to obtain:
k =
 
A1 
#1  w
!1=(1  )
(25)
m =

A1 
# w1 
1=(1  )
(26)
where #   (1 + h) +  + h2=2 > 0 is a collection of exogenous parameters.
In order to be viable, the steady state must satisfy the transversality condition (11). Straight-
forward computations show that (11) holds for all  > 0:10
2.6.2 Transitional dynamics
The dynamic system (21)-(23) is nonlinear. Consequently, to analyze the dynamic properties
of the steady state we need to linearize the system around the steady-state vector, fk; q;mg.
By using (24)-(26) to substitute for k, q and m, the linearized system can be written as:0BB@
_k
_q
_m
1CCA = J
0BB@
k   k
q   q
m m
1CCA (27)
where
J 
0BBBB@
0 1h

A1 
#1  w
 1
1  
0
(1  )
h
#2(1 )  w1 
A1 
i 1
1  
  

#1  w1 
A
 1
1  
# 0   (1  ) w
1CCCCA
is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the rest point, fk; q;mg.11
10Solving (7) and (21) forwardly and then substituting the resulting equations into (11) yields:
lim
t!1
q (0) e tk (0) e[(q
 1)=h ]t = 0:
Next, by using (24) to get rid of q, the previous expression boils down to:
lim
t!1
(1 + h) (0) k (0) e t = 0:
As is easy to verify, as t! 0 the limit approaches zero if and only if  > 0.
11See Appendix A.1 for the computational details.
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For the competitive equilibrium to be saddle-path stable, the Jacobian matrix has to have
two eigenvalues with positive real parts and one eigenvalue with negative real part. This is so
because the initial condition of the predetermined variable, k (0), is given, while the remaining
two initial conditions for the two non-predetermined variables, q (0) and m (0), are free. In
Appendix A.1 we show that the determinant of J is positive, while the trace of J can be
either negative or positive depending on the size of the subjective discount rate of natives, .
This implies that the number of eigenvalues with positive real parts can be either one or three
depending on the sign of the trace of J. Yet, by using the DescartesRule of Sign, it is possible
to demonstrate that the number of eigenvalues with positive real parts is always one, and then
that the steady state of the model is always locally indeterminate.
The following proposition summarizes the dynamic properties of the model:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the internationally given interest rate, r, is stationary and equal
to the subjective discount rate of natives, . Then, there exists an indeterminate steady state
with a continuum of equilibrium trajectories indexed by initial immigration ratio, m (0), each of
which converges to the steady state given by (24)-(26).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
According to Proposition 1, the presence of perfect world capital markets makes the model
exhibit local indeterminacy. This result is in sharp contrast to the closed-economy literature on
international migration and macroeconomic dynamics, which predicts that the steady state is
always determinate with a unique stable arm converging to the steady state. In contrast, our
model predicts the existence of a continuum of stable arms, indexed by m (0), each converging
to the same steady-state equilibrium. This implies that, (i) while the transitional growth rates
of the domestic economy are indeterminate, the long-run growth rate is always determinate
and equates zero in the steady state; (ii) structurally identical economies can exhibit di¤erent
speeds of convergence if their initial immigration ratio, m (0), is not the same.
Having demonstrated that the model exhibits local indeterminacy, in the next section we
will focus on the dynamic properties of domestic consumption and the current account.
2.6.3 Domestic consumption and the current account
Equation (19) describes the dynamics of the current account of the domestic economy. To study
how they evolve over time, we write (19) in per native worker terms and linearize it around the
steady state. The resulting di¤erential equation reads:12
_b = b+  (k;m)  c (0) + 	 (0) e2t +(0) e3t; (28)
where 	(0) and (0) are two collections of constant parameters - including m (0)-, while 2
and 3 are the two negative eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix (27). The  (k
;m) term on
12See Appendix B for both the analytical details of the derivation of (28) as well as the compositions and the
denitions of the two collections of exogenous parameters 	(0) and (0).
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the right-hand side of (28) is the steady-state net current income per native. It is given by the
di¤erence between the steady-state gross current income per native, (1  )A(k) (m) , and
capital adjustment costs,
h
(q)2   1
i
k=2h.
By solving (28) forwardly and imposing national solvency through the transversality condi-
tion (12), the complete solution of (28) is given by:
b (t) =

b (0) +
	 (0)
2   r
+
(0)
3   r

  	(0)
2   r
e2t   (0)
3   r
e3t, (29)
where, in order to avoid explosive paths for b (t), the following initial condition for domestic
consumption has been imposed:
c (0) = 

b (0) +
 (k;m)
r
+
	(0)
2   
+
(0)
3   

. (30)
According to (29), the current account is subject to transitional dynamics. To see this more
succinctly, suppose that the domestic country is initially a creditor in world capital markets,
such that b (0) > 0. Suppose also that at t = 0 the domestic economy is not in its steady
state. As time goes by, the two exponential terms on the right-hand side of (29) approach zero
and the net stock of foreign bonds, b (t), asymptotically approaches the nal term b (0). Yet,
even though the initial stock of foreign bonds, b (0), is known at t = 0, the time path of b (t)
is indeterminate because of the presence of 	(0) and (0) on the right-hand side of (29). In
fact, since both 	(0) and (0) depend on the initial level of the immigration ratio, m (0),
there exists a continuum of transitional paths for b (t), each for any possible initial value of the
immigration ratio, m (0).
A similar consideration applies to the initial value of domestic consumption, c (0). A glance
at (30), indeed, shows that c (0) crucially depends on the two parameter collections 	(0) and
(0). We can therefore conclude that the initial value of domestic consumption is also indeter-
minate because of the presence of m (0) in both 	(0) and (0).
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2 Suppose the internationally given interest rate, r, is stationary and equal to the
subjective discount rate of natives, . Then, both the transitional path of the current account,
b (t), and the level of consumption per native, c (0), are indeterminate and depend on the initial
immigration ratio, m (0).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The results summarized by Proposition 2 constitute another novelty for the literature on
international migration and macroeconomic dynamics. Nevertheless, since the steady state
is locally indeterminate, the model does not lend itself to a clear-cut prediction about the
macroeconomic implications of migration. For this reason, in the next section we will tackle
the issue of the dynamic aspects of international migration numerically, through a series of
calibration exercises.
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2.6.4 Quantitative Analysis
In the previous sections we have studied the dynamic properties of the model without wondering
what impact migration will have on the time paths of the main macroeconomic variables of the
model. Unfortunately, indeterminacy does not allow us to perform a standard comparative
dynamics analysis, so in this section we will study the adjustment dynamics of the model
through a series of numerical simulations.
We begin by calibrating a benchmark economy using the set of parameters representative of
a small open economy reported in Table 1. We then calibrate a baseline scenario, which occurs
when all the endogenous variables are at their steady-state levels, including m (0). Finally,
we contrast the baseline scenario with two further alternative scenarios in which the initial
immigration ratio, m (0) ; is assumed to be, respectively, larger and smaller than its steady-
state value, m.
Initial conditions k (0) = k = 2:39
Preference parameters  = 0:04,  = 1
Technology parameters A = 1,  = 0:3,  = 0:1
External sector r =  = 0:04
Migration  = 0:05, w = 0:4, m (0) = m = 0:2
Capital accumulation h = 15,  = 0:05
Table 1: Perfect world capital markets: Baseline values
In the simulation, we assume that r =  and set  = 0:04 so that the annual interest rate is
roughly 4 percent (see Table 1). The Arrow-Pratt relative-aversion risk index  = 1 is chosen in
order to resemble logarithmic preferences. We choose the technology parameters A = 1,  = 0:3
and  = 0:1 to match the empirical evidence of Gollin (2002), and the rate of depreciation
 = 0:05 consistent with Cooley (1995). The choice of adjustment costs h = 15 is consistent
with Ortigueira and Santos (1997), who prove that values of h in the range of 10 to 16 are in
line with a plausible speed of convergence. Finally, we set the elasticity parameter  = 0:05 and
the reference wage w = 0:5528, so that, based on (26), the steady-state immigration ratio, m,
is roughly 20 percent.
The adjustment paths are depicted in Figure 1. The continuous line represents the bench-
mark case m (0) = m, while the discontinuous lines represent the two alternative scenarios:
(a) m (0) > m, depicted by the dotted line; (b) m (0) < m, depicted by the dashed line.
Consider rst scenario (a), in which the immigration ratio, m, is initially larger than its
steady-state value. In such a scenario, foreign labor is relatively abundant, implying that
the wage bill paid to natives is higher than its steady-state value and the wage bill paid to
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Figure 1: The basic model without borrowing constraints: Impulse response functions. Scenario
(a): dashed lines; Scenario (b): dotted lines.
immigrants is lower than both its steady-state value and the reference wage, w. In this case, the
immigration ratio converges to the steady state from above, implying that during the transition
the immigration rate is always negative, _m < 0, and that the wage rates move in the opposite
directions so that wage inequality, measured by the index wn=wm, shrinks.
The abundance of foreign labor positively a¤ects consumption per native, which turns out to
be always larger than its baseline value. Not surprisingly, this result stems from the fact that the
perfect capital markets assumption dichotomizes the model, by making domestic consumption
totally independent of domestic production.
As regards capital accumulation, the gradual decrease in the immigration ratio has a double
e¤ect on the transitional path of capital per domestic worker. Firstly, since initially m (0) > m
and the marginal product of capital, rk, is higher than its long-run value, the rate of return
on capital assets - left-hand side of (10) - turns out to be higher than the rate of return on
foreign bonds plus the rate of depreciation - right-hand side of (10). This spurs investment and
provides an incentive for natives to increase the size of domestic capital per domestic worker.
We refer to this e¤ect as the capitalization e¤ect, which leads to an increase in the stock of
capital per domestic worker over time. Secondly, the gradual reduction in the migration ratio,
m, makes the marginal product of capital, rk, fall over time. This a¤ects the rate of return on
capital assets - left-hand side of (10) - negatively and it induces natives to reduce the domestic
investment in capital accumulation. This e¤ect is a migration e¤ect, which causes the stock of
capital per domestic worker to shrink over time.
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The capitalization e¤ect goes in the opposite direction of the migration e¤ect. Consequently,
the net e¤ect on the dynamics of capital per domestic worker depends on whether the former is
able to prevail over the latter. As the time path of k is hamp-shaped (see Figure 1), the capital-
ization e¤ect initially dominates the migration e¤ect, thereby leading to a temporary increase
in the stock of capital per worker. However, as the immigration ratio approaches its long-run
equilibrium value, the decreasing returns to capital and labor diminish the capitalization e¤ect
and increase the migration e¤ect. Thus, after a few periods, the migration e¤ect dominates the
capitalization e¤ect and k begins to fall monotonically to its steady-state value, k.
Notice that the initial increase in capital assets investment goes hand in hand with an in-
crease in foreign bonds investment. This is so because the initial abundance of foreign labor
sets both domestic output and national saving higher than their steady-state values. This in-
duces natives to increase their stocks of foreign bonds and capital assets initially. Consequently,
during the transition a part of saving ows out of the domestic country, so that, in the steady
state, the domestic economy experiences a permanent increase in the stock of foreign bonds.
Consider now scenario (b), which occurs when the immigration ratio, m, is initially smaller
than its steady-state value. In such a scenario, foreign labor is relatively scarce, implying
that the wage bill paid to natives is lower than its equilibrium value and the wage bill paid to
immigrants is higher than both its equilibrium value and the reference wage, w. In this case, the
immigration ratio converges to the steady state from below, implying that along the transition
path the immigration rate is always positive, _m > 0, and that the wage rates of natives and
immigrants adjust dynamically, so wage inequality diminishes over time.
In contrast with scenario (a), the shortage of foreign labor negatively a¤ects both domestic
consumption, which turns out to be always smaller than its baseline value, and capital per
worker. Once again, the fall in domestic consumption is permanent, while that in capital per
worker is only temporary. In particular, if the economy experiences an initial shortage of foreign
labor, the adjustment dynamics of the capital stock, k, are reversed, meaning that the time path
of k is initially downward sloping and then upward sloping.
The economic explanation for this U-shaped behavior of the variable k is similar to that of
the previous scenario and is mainly due to the di¤erent combination of the capitalization e¤ect
and the migration e¤ect. In contrast to scenario (a), in fact, the migration e¤ect is initially
positive, but it is dominated by the capitalization e¤ect, which is instead negative. This causes
the stock of capital per domestic worker to fall initially. In the long-run, though, the inow of
new immigrants leads to the migration e¤ect prevailing over the capitalization e¤ect. When this
occurs, the time path of capital reaches its bottom and then starts growing over time towards
its equilibrium value.
As regards the stock of foreign bonds, in this case the dynamics of the variable b are reversed.
Initially, the fall in capital assets investment is accompanied by a fall in foreign bonds investment.
This is so because the initial shortage of foreign labor causes both the domestic output and the
national saving to be lower than their steady-state values. This induces natives to sell both
foreign bonds and capital assets initially. However, in contrast with the domestic capital stock,
whose initial reduction is only temporary, the fall in the stock of foreign bonds is permanent.
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The following proposition summarizes the dynamic properties of the model
Proposition 3 (Numerical) Suppose the internationally given interest rate, r, is stationary
and equal to the subjective discount rate of natives, . Suppose also that at t = 0 all endogenous
variables are at their steady-state values except the immigration ratio, m. Then, the adjustment
dynamics of the economy depend on whether the immigration ratio, m, is initially larger or
smaller than its long-run equilibrium value (26). In particular, it is possible to distinguish the
following dynamics:
(a)m (0) > m; if the immigration ratio is initially larger than its steady-state value (26), the
adjustment dynamics of the economy imply: (i) a permanent increase in domestic consumption,
c; (ii) a temporary increase in the stock of capital per domestic worker, k; (iii) a permanent fall
in wage inequality, wnwm ; (iv) a permanent increase in the stock of foreign bonds per native; b.
(b) m (0) < m; if the immigration ratio is initially lower than its steady-state value (26),
the adjustment dynamics of the economy imply: (i) a temporary fall in domestic consumption.
c; (ii) a permanent fall in the stock of capital per domestic worker, k; (iii) a permanent increase
in wage inequality, wnwm ; (iv) a permanent fall in the stock of foreign bonds per native, b.
The dynamic properties described by Proposition 3 rely on the assumption that natives can
borrow as much as they want at a xed interest rate. This assumption is obviously too strong,
especially if one thinks of the common practice in capital markets of linking the interest rate
to the amount of debt. Consequently, in the next section we provide a natural extension of the
basic model to the case in which the domestic economy faces an upward-sloping curve of debt.
3 The model economy with borrowing restrictions
This section extends the model of Section 2 to the case in which the interest rate is no longer
exogenously xed but depends on the amount of debt. In doing so, we assume that the domestic
economy is a net-debtor economy - i.e. B < 0 - and that the cost of borrowing is endogenously
given and equal to:
rb  r + e(
B
K )   1, (31)
where   0 is the borrowing premium. Based on (31), the interest rate, rb, increases with
the nations debt-capital ratio, B=K, provided that the borrowing premium, , is strictly larger
than zero.13
The representative native takes rb as predetermined and seeks to maximize the utility func-
tion (1), subject to the capital accumulation equation (3), and the new foreign bonds accumu-
lation equation:
13Observe that the previous case of perfect world capital markets can be viewed as a particular case of this
model occurring when the borrowing premium disappears,  = 0, so that r  r always holds.
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_b = rbb+ c+ i

1 +
h
2

i
k

  wn   rkk; (32)
where, once again, (2) has been used to substitute for  (i; k). In contrast to (4), (32) is written
from the standpoint of a debtor and asserts that the stock of debt of the representative native,
b, increases over time if and only if domestic consumption, c, investment expenses, i

1 + h2
 
i
k

,
plus the outstanding interest payments, rbb, exceed his net current revenue, wn + rkk.
While the optimality conditions with respect to c and i remain unchanged and given by (5)
and (6) - with the latter implying (9) -, the optimality conditions with respect to b and k change
to incorporate the borrowing premium (31) and become:
_c
c
=  1
h
r + e(
b
k )   1  
i
(33)
Ak 1m
q
+
(q   1)2
2hq
+
_q
q
= r + e(
b
k )   1 + : (34)
Equation (33) is the Euler equation in the case of an upward-sloping supply curve of debt.
In contrast to (13), consumption is no longer independent of the production side of the economy
since the interest rate is now positively related to the debt to capital ratio, b=k. As in the case
of (8), equation (34) can be viewed as the new arbitrage equation between foreign bonds and
domestic capital assets, in which the depreciation-adjusted rate of returns on foreign bonds,
given by the right-hand side of (34), change to take into account the dependence of the interest
rate on the debt to capital ratio, b=k.
By plugging (16), (17), (9) and (31) into (32), the dynamics of the net foreign debt is
governed by the following di¤erential equation:
_b =
h
r + e(
b
k )   1
i
b+ c+

q2   1
2h

k   (1  )Akm : (35)
The competitive equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
Denition 3: Suppose the world capital markets are imperfect, such as that the domestic
economy faces an upward-sloping supply curve of debt as that described by (31). Then, for any
pair of initial conditions, fk (0) ; b (0)g, a competitive equilibrium for this dynamic small open
economy is given by a set of time paths fc (t) ; k (t) ; q (t) ;m (t) ; b (t)gt2(0;1), a pair of input
prices fwn (t) ; wm (t)gt2(0;1) and a pair of rates of return on capital assets and foreign bonds
frk (t) ; rb (t)gt2(0;1), such that:
1. natives maximize their discounted utility function (1) subject to the two accumulation
constraints (3) and (32), the installation cost function (2), and the two transversality
conditions (12) and (11);
2. rms maximize prots according to production technology (15);
3. people migrate either in or out of the domestic economy according to the migration function
(20).
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To analyze the dynamics of the domestic economy, we need to consider how consumption
per native, c, capital per domestic worker, k, and external debt per native b, evolve over time,
together with the relative shadow price of the installed capital, q, and the immigration ratio,
m. To derive these paths, we resort to equations (3), (20), (33), (34) and (35), which we hereby
summarize in the following algebraic system:
_c =  1
h
r + e(
b
k )   1  
i
c (36)
_k = k

q   1
h

  k (37)
_q =
h
r + e(
b
k )   1 + 
i
q   (q   1)
2
2h
  Ak 1m (38)
_m = 
h
Akm 1   w
i
m (39)
_b =
h
r + e(
b
k )   1
i
b+ c+

q2   1
2h

k   (1  )Akm : (40)
In the system, k and b are the predetermined variables, while c, q and m are the jump
variables. In order for consumption, c, capital per domestic worker, k, net foreign debt b, to be
stable over time, and for the relative price of installed capital, q, and the immigration ratio, m,
to be constant over time, the dynamic system (36)-(40) must present at least one rest point,
attained when _c = _k = _b = _q = _m = 0. In the rest point, the domestic economy is said to be in
its steady state, which we dene as follows
Denition 4: Suppose the world capital markets are imperfect, such that the domestic
economy faces an upward-sloping supply curve of debt such as that described by (31). A steady
state for the domestic economy consists of a vector fc; k; b; q;mg satisfying condition _c =
_k = _b = _q = _m = 0.
By imposing the steady-state condition _c = _k = _b = _q = _m = 0 on the dynamic system (36)-
(40), the corresponding steady-state vector fc; k; b; q;mg is the solution of the following
steady-state system:
r + e
b
k   1 =  (41)
q   1
h
=  (42)
A (k) 1 (m) =

r + e
b
k   1 + 

q   (q
   1)2
2h
(43)
A (k) (m) 1 = w (44)
c = A (k) (m)   k

1 +
h
2

 

r + e
b
k   1

b  m w: (45)
where # is the same collection of exogenous parameters as in Section 3.1.
System (41)-(45) has a simple recursive structure. First, the steady-state shadow price of
capital, q, is determined by (42). As is easy to verify, its value is the same as (24), meaning
that the regime of the world capital market does not a¤ect the shadow price of capital. Next,
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by plugging (24) and (41) into (43) and then solving the resulting equation simultaneously with
(44), we obtain a closed-form solution for both the steady-state stock of capital per domestic
worker, k, and for the steady-state immigration ratio, m. Once again, their values are the
same as in (24) and (26), so we can conclude that the regime of the world capital market a¤ects
neither the steady-state level of the stock of capital per domestic worker, nor the steady-state
level of the immigration ratio.
Finally, with k, q, m and b in hand, the steady-state debt to capital ratio, b, and the
steady-state consumption per native, c, are determined by (41) and (45) respectively.
3.1 Transitional dynamics
The dynamic system (36)-(40) is too complex to be studied analytically. Consequently, to
analyze its local stability properties we resort to numerical simulations. Our main interest
is to study the sign of the real parts of the complex eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix and
check whether the introduction of capital market imperfections a¤ects the indeterminacy result
outlined in Proposition 1.
Since indeterminacy arises when  = 0, our objective is to verify whether the sign of the
real parts of the eigenvalues changes when the borrowing premium, , is allowed to vary.
Initial conditions k (0) = k = 2:39, b (0) = b =  0:16
Preference parameters  = 0:04,  = 1
Technology parameters A = 1,  = 0:3,  = 0:1
External sector r =  = 0:04,  = 0:15
Migration  = 0:05, w = 0:4, m (0) = m = 0:2
Capital accumulation h = 15,  = 0:05
Table 2: Imperfect capital markets: Baseline values
To set all the exogenous parameters, we use the same parametrization shown in Table 1 and
allow  to vary within a range of values (see Table 2). For the range of variation of , we set the
lower bounding of the range equal to zero - which is the case of perfect capital markets -, and
the upper bounding equal to  = 0:3 - which is twice the reference value used by the literature
for small open economy in their simulation exercises (see Turnovsky, 2005).
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 1 2 3 4 5
0 +     n:a: n:a
0.05 +       +
0.10 +       +
0.15 +       +
0.20 +       +
0.25 +       +
0.30 +       +
Table 3: Simulation results
The simulation results are reported in Table 3. The rst column of the table reports the
values of the borrowing premium, , while the remaining ve columns report the values of the
real parts of the complex eigenvalues. In the table, all ve eigenvalues are real-valued, with three
of them negative and the remaining two positive. Since the number of stable roots is larger
than the number of predetermined variables, Table 3 conrms the indeterminacy result of the
previous section. Thus, even in the presence of a borrowing constraint, there exists a continuum
of converging paths in the neighborhood of the steady state depending on the initial level of
the immigration ratio, m (0). This implies that the dynamics of the model do not change in the
presence of an endogenously determined interest rate and is robust to changes in the regime of
the world capital markets.
The following proposition summarizes these results
Proposition 4 (Numerical) Suppose the world capital markets are imperfect, such as that the
domestic economy faces an upward-sloping supply curve of debt as that described by (31). Then,
the Jacobian matrix has three eigenvalues with negative real parts and two eigenvalues with
positive real parts. The steady state is locally indeterminate.
Proof. See Appendix B
3.2 Quantitative analysis
This section extends the quantitative analysis of Section 2.8 to the case in which the domestic
economy faces an upward-sloping supply curve of debt. In particular, in this section we are
interested in testing whether the dynamic properties of the basic model - mostly those regarding
domestic consumption, capital accumulation and net foreign debt - are robust to changes in the
regime of the world capital markets. In doing so, we adopt the same two-step simulation strategy
of Section 2.8, which consists in rst calibrating a baseline scenario in which the immigration
ratio is initially at its steady-state value, m, then in contrasting the baseline scenario with
two further alternative scenarios in which the initial immigration ratio, m (0), is assumed to be,
respectively, larger and smaller than its steady-state value. In all simulations we set  = 0:15, so
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Figure 2: The basic model with borrowing constraints: Impulse response functions. Scenario
(a): dotted lines; Scenario (b): dashed lines.
that the speed of convergence is in line with the small open economy literature (see Turnovsky,
2005), and r =  = 0:04, so that the steady-state stock of foreign bonds in the domestic economy
is always equal to zero.
The adjustment paths are depicted in Figure 2. For many variables, the adjustment dy-
namics depicted in Figure 2 are similar to those depicted in Figure 1, except for domestic
consumption, c, and the net national debt, b, whose adjustment paths are now only temporarily
a¤ected by the initial level of the immigration ratio, m.
We start by considering scenario (a), which occurs when the level of the immigration ratio
is initially higher that its long-run equilibrium value. In contrast to the case of perfect world
capital markets, in the presence of an upward-sloping supply curve of debt the impact of changes
in the initial immigration ratio, m (0), on domestic consumption is only temporary. In fact, if
the immigration ratio is initially larger than its long-run value, the time path of domestic
consumption is hamp-shaped, meaning that it initially increases and then decreases towards its
steady-state value.
The non-linear behavior of c can be explained as follows. Initially, the wage rate of domestic
workers, wn, is lower than its steady-state value, while the marginal product of capital, rk, is
higher than its steady-state value. However, as m approaches m, both wn and rk begin to
approach their steady-state values. This causes the debt to capital ratio to fall and the interest
rate to decrease initially, thereby causing domestic consumption to rise further because of the
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lower cost of borrowing. The strong increase in domestic consumption causes the net nancial
position of the domestic economy to deteriorate at rst; i.e. the net national debt per native,
b, increases initially. Thus, as the pace of capital accumulation starts falling and the cost of
debt rising, natives adjust their intertemporal consumption pattern by gradually reducing c.
In the long-run, both domestic consumption and capital per domestic worker approach their
steady-state values, c and k, from above, while the stock of the net national debt converges
towards its starting level, b, from below.14
We now turn to scenario (b), which occurs when the initial level of the immigration ratio
is lower than its long-run equilibrium value. If the immigration ratio is initially lower than its
long-run value, the time path of domestic consumption is U-shaped, meaning that c initially
decreases and then increases to approach its long-run equilibrium value, c. In this case, the
low immigration ratio causes the wage rate of domestic workers, wn, to be higher than their
steady-state value and the marginal product of capital, rk, to be lower than their steady-state
value. As wn and rk adjust to approach their steady states, both domestic consumption and
capital per domestic worker fall initially, thereby making the debt to capital ratio rise and the
interest rate increase. This, in turn, causes domestic consumption to decrease further because
of the higher cost of borrowing and the net nancial position of the domestic economy to
improve initially; i.e. the net national debt per native, b, decreases initially. However, as the
pace of capital accumulation starts to increase and the cost of debt to fall, natives adjust their
intertemporal consumption pattern by gradually increasing c. As domestic consumption and
capital per worker approach their long-run value, c and k, from below, the net national debt
increases over time and converges towards its starting level, b, from above.
The following proposition summarizes all the results
Proposition 5 (Numerical) Suppose the world capital markets are imperfect, such that the
domestic economy faces an upward-sloping supply curve of debt such as that described by (31).
Suppose further that at t = 0 all endogenous variables are at their steady-state values, except
the immigration ratio, m. Then, the adjustment dynamics of the economy depend on whether
the immigration ratio, m, is initially larger or smaller than its long-run equilibrium value. In
particular, it is possible to distinguish the following dynamics:
(a) m (0) > m; if the immigration ratio is initially larger than its steady state value (26), the
adjustment dynamics of the economy imply: (i) a temporary increase in domestic consumption,
c; (ii) a temporary increase in the stock of capital per domestic worker, k; (iii) a permanent
fall in wage inequality, wnwm ; (iv) a temporary increase in the stock of foreign bonds per native; b.
(b) m (0) < m; if the immigration ratio is initially lower than its steady state value (26),
the adjustment dynamics of the economy imply: (i) a temporary fall in domestic consumption.
14Being a high-order dynamic system, the model allows for nonlinear adjustment paths, meaning that some
endogenous variables - such as the net national debt in Figure 2 - may overshoot their respective steady-state
values.
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c; (ii) a temporary fall in the stock of capital per domestic worker, k; (iii) a permanent increase
in wage inequality, wnwm ; (iv) a temporary fall in the stock of foreign bonds per native, b.
4 Centrally-planned economy
4.1 Characterization of the equilibrium
As a nal exercise, this section addresses the question of whether the competitive equilibrium
of Section 2 is Pareto optimal or not. In doing so, we assume that the domestic economy is
governed by a benevolent social planner, who chooses consumption and investment, c and i,
and the rates of accumulation of capital assets and foreign bonds, _k and _b, directly so as to
maximize the utility function (1), subject to the accumulation equation (3) and the aggregate
resource constraint of the economy:
_b = rb+ (1  )Akm   c   (i; k) (46)
where the installation cost function,  (i; k), is still given by (2).
The discounted Hamiltonian for this problem reads:
H = e tu (c) + 

rb+ (1  )Akm   c  i

1 +
h
2
i
k

+ q0 (i  k)
where  is the shadow value of wealth in the form of internationally traded bonds and q0 is the
shadow value of wealth in the form of installed capital.
The rst order conditions with respect to c, i, b and k are given by:
e tu0 (c)   = 0 (47)
 

1 + h
i
k

+ q = 0 (48)
r =  
_

(49)
(1  )Ak 1m
q
+
h
2q

i
k
2
  (r + ) =   _q
q
: (50)
where, once again, we used  as numéraire so as to rewrite the whole problem in terms of the
new co-state variable, q  q0=.
Notice that the optimality conditions with respect to consumption, private investment and
foreign bonds, (47), (48) and (49) are identical to the corresponding conditions (5), (6) and (7)
of the basic model. As a result, we can solve (48) for i and get the same investment function (9),
and combine (47) and (49) to get the same domestic consumption function (14). The growth
rate of domestic consumption of the centrally-planned economy therefore coincides with that of
the market economy, though its level will be di¤erent due to the fact that the determinants of
c (0) are no longer the same.
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The optimality condition with respect to the installed capital per worker, (50), is now
modied and can be rearranged to get:
(1  ) Ak
 1m
q
+
_q
q
+
q2   1
2hq
= r + : (51)
Equation (51) is the arbitrage condition between the foreign bonds and domestic capital
assets of the social planner. Mathematically, (51) is identical to (10) except for the presence of
the term 1   on the rate of return of installed capital (rst term on the left-hand side). Since
 < 1, the rate of return of installed capital is lower in the case of a centrally-planned economy.
This is so because the social planner internalizes the fact that at each point in time a share of
national resources are consumed by immigrants.
Equations (47)-(50), along with two transversality conditions identical to (11) and (12),
complete the description of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions of the social planners utility
maximization problem. By letting "O" denote optimal paths, a dynamic equilibrium for this
centrally-planned small open economy can be dened as follows:
Denition 5: Suppose the internationally given interest rate, r, is stationary and equal to
the subjective discount rate of natives, . For any pair of initial conditions, fkO (0) ; bO (0)g,
a dynamic equilibrium for this centrally-planned small open economy is given by a set of time
paths for the endogenous variables, fcO (t) ; kO (t) ; qO (t) ;mO (t) ; bO (t)gt2(0;1), such that:
1. the social planner maximizes the discounted ow of utility (1) subject to the aggregate
resource constraint (46), the accumulation constraints (3), the installation cost function
(2), and the two transversality conditions (11) and (12);
2. people migrate either in or out of the domestic economy according to the migration function
(20).
Using (9) to get rid of i, the dynamics of this small open economy are summarized by the
following system of three non-linear di¤erential equations:
_kO = kO

qO   1
h

  kO (52)
_qO = (+ ) qO   (qO   1)
2
2h
   (1  )Ak 1O mO (53)
_mO = 
h
AkOm 1O   w
i
mO: (54)
A steady state is constituted by a rest point of system (52)-(54). Thus, imposing the steady-
state condition _kO = _qO = _mO = 0 yields:
qO = 1 + h (55)
kO =
"
A (1  )1  1 
#1  w
#1=(1  )
(56)
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mO =

A (1  ) 1 
# w1 
1=(1  )
: (57)
The steady-state solutions (55)-(57) represent the rst best resource allocation for the do-
mestic economy. Notice that the solution for the optimal shadow price of capital, (55), is
identical to that of the competitive economy, (5). This result is not surprising. Indeed, since -
via (6) and (48) - the investment function did not change because of the presence of the social
planner, the pace of capital accumulation of the two economies - i.e. the centrally-planned
economy and the competitive economy - has to be the same. This means that the equilibrium
shadow price of the social planner and of the decentralized economy must coincide, implying
that the private incentive of natives to invest in capital assets is equal to that of the social
planner.
As regards the two remaining endogenous variables, kO and mO, the di¤erence between the
rst best values, (56) and (57), and the competitive equilibrium values, (25) and (26), is due to
the presence of the term 1    in the numerator of both (56) and (57). Since  < 1, long-run
equilibrium value of the immigration ratio of the decentralized economy, m, is larger than the
rst best solution, mO. This means that the market economy tends to have more immigrants in
the equilibrium. By the same token, long-run equilibrium value of capital per domestic worker
of the decentralized economy, k, is larger than its optimal value, kO, meaning that in the
competitive economy there will be an over-accumulation of capital in the steady state.
The economic explanation for this result is not di¢ cult to grasp. When deciding about
capital investment, natives do not take into account that a share of the national resources is
currently used to pay immigrants. On the one hand, this causes both the level of investment, i,
and the stock of capital per domestic worker, k, to be larger than the rst-best values. On the
other, over-accumulation of capital increases the wage bill paid to immigrants with respect to
the rst best level, thereby leading to an overow of foreign workers into the domestic economy.
Summing up
Proposition 6 Suppose the internationally given interest rate, r, is stationary and equal to the
subjective discount rate of natives, . Then, the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto optimal
and presents the following characteristics:
1. the steady-state level of the capital per domestic worker of the competitive economy is
higher than the rst best, k > kO;
2. the steady-state immigration ratio of the competitive economy is higher than the rst best,
m > mO.
4.2 Policy implications
In the previous section we saw that the market economy is incapable of reaching the rst
best. The government can pursue two di¤erent policies to x the markets ine¢ ciencies. The
rst policy consists in correcting private incentive to accumulate capital assets through the
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introduction of a tax on capital earnings equal to k 2 (0; 1). The second policy consists in
adjusting the immigration ratio through the introduction of an immigration fee, m > 0. To
avoid distorcionary e¤ects, the proceeding of taxation are supposed to be rebated to natives as
lump-sum transfers.
Let us consider the rst policy. The presence of a tax on capital earnings modies the
nativesarbitrage condition between capital assets and foreign bonds, which becomes:
(1  k) rk
q
+
_q
q
+
(q   1)2
2hq
= r + .
Though the steady-state shadow price of capital does not change because of capital taxation,
the two remaining steady-state solutions, (25) and (26), change accordingly and read:
~k =
"
A (1  k)1  1 
#1  w
#1=(1  )
(58)
~m =

A (1  k) 1 
# w1 
1=(1  )
; (59)
where the "tilda" denotes steady-state values in the presence of capital taxation.
The rst best is established if the government sets k such that k = ~k and m = ~m. By
using (25) and (26) to replace k and ~k and (58) and (59) to substitute for ~k and ~m, it is easy
to verify that the rst best allocation can be established if and only if the optimal tax rate on
capital earnings is equal to:
k = :
Consider now the second policy. As said, it consists in introducing an immigration fee, m,
acting as a deterrent for migration. It can also be thought of as kind of "ticket" that each
immigrant needs to pay at each moment in time in order to be considered a legal immigrant.
The introduction of the immigration fee modies the migration function, which becomes
_M = 
h
Akm 1   (1 + m) w
i
M .
Once again, the steady-state shadow price of capital does not change because of the immi-
gration fee, while the two remaining steady-state solutions, (25) and (26), change accordingly
and read:
k^ =
"
A1 
#1  (1 + m) w
#1=(1  )
(60)
m^ =

A1 
# (1 + m)
1  w1 
1=(1  )
; (61)
where the "hat" denotes steady-state values in the presence of the immigration fee.
The rst best is established if the government sets m such that k = k^ and m = m^:
However, using (25) and (26) to substitute for k and m, and (60) and (61) to substitute for
k^ and m^, it is easy to verify that there does not exist a unique optimal fee capable of ensuring
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k = k^ and m = m^ simultaneously. Indeed, by solving k = k^ and m = m^ separately, it
turns out that there exists two possible fees (respectively 1m = (1  )=( 1)   1 and 2m =
(1  )=( 1)   1), both incapable of getting the rst best level of both k and m, except in
the particular case in which the parameter restriction,  = ; holds. This result leads us to the
conclusion that taxing immigration cannot be viewed as e¤ective as taxing capital earnings to
establish the rst best allocation.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have developed a dynamic small open economy model to study the macroeco-
nomic e¤ects of international migration. In the model, individuals are supposed to be identical
in all but their nationality and move from one country to another because of the existence of
international di¤erences in wages. The paper focuses on the standpoint of a host country and
can be ideally split into two parts according to whether the world capital markets are assumed
to be perfect or imperfect.
In the rst part of the paper, we focus on the case of perfect world capital markets, in
which the cost of borrowing does not depend on the level of the external debt of the domestic
country. We nd that the steady-state equilibrium is indeterminate, so there exists a continuum
of converging transitional paths depending on the initial value of the immigration ratio. To
study the dynamic implication of migration on domestic consumption, foreign debt and capital
accumulation, we simulate the model by distinguishing three di¤erent scenarios depending on
whether the immigration ratio is larger, equal or smaller than its long-run equilibrium value.
We nd that changes in the initial level of the immigration ratio have only a temporary e¤ect
on capital accumulation, whereas they have permanent e¤ects on domestic consumption, net
national debt and wage inequality.
In the second part of the paper, we extend the basic model to the case in which the cost of
borrowing increases with the level of the external debt. Due to the complexity of the dynamic
system, the stability analysis is carried out numerically and considers the borrowing premium
as the key parameter di¤erentiating the two capital market regimes. We nd that the inde-
terminacy result is robust to changes in the world capital markets regime, but also that the
presence of an upward-sloping curve of debt modies the adjustment dynamics of the model.
More specically, we nd that changes in the initial level of the immigration ratio have only a
temporary impact on domestic consumption, net national debt and capital accumulation, while
they have permanent impacts on wage inequality.
Finally, we conclude the paper by investigating the normative properties of the basic model.
In doing so, we adopt the Social planners approach and use the steady-state solutions of the
centrally-planned economy as a benchmark to check whether the competitive equilibrium is
also Pareto optimal. We nd that in the decentralized equilibrium natives overaccumulate
capital and the domestic economy overattracts immigrants. This result occurs because natives
do not take into account the impact that their investment decisions have on the wage bill of
immigrants. Thus, to establish the rst best the government can pursue two alternative policies:
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taxing capital earnings or introducing an immigration tax. Surprisingly, we nd that the only
policy that is e¤ective in establishing the rst best is taxing capital earnings.
28
Appendix A
A.1 Linearization of the dynamic system and stability analysis
This appendix provides the analytical details of the stability analysis as well as the for-
mal proof of Proposition 1. First-order Taylor expansion around the steady-state vector,
fk; q;mg, gives:0BB@
_k
_q
_m
1CCA = J 
0BB@
k   k
q   q
m m
1CCA
where the matrix of coe¢ cients is given by:
J =
0BB@
q 1
h    k

h 0
 (1  )A (k) 2 (m) r +    q 1h A (k) 1 (m) 1
A (k) 1 (m) 0 A (k) (m) 1    wo
1CCA
where #   (1 + h) + + h2=2. By using the steady-state conditions (24)-(26), the matrix of
coe¢ cients can be simplied to:
J =
0BBBB@
0 1h

A1 
#1  w
 1
1  
0
(1  )
h
#2(1 )  w1 
A1 
i 1
1  
  

#1  w1 
A
 1
1  
# 0   (1  ) w
1CCCCA
The eigenvalues of J are the solution of its characteristic equation:
 3 + TrJ2  B+DetJ = 0; (A.1)
where:
TrJ =    (1  ) w (A.2)
B = jJ11j+ jJ22j+ jJ33j =  
(1  )#+ h (1  ) w
h
< 0 (A.3)
DetJ =
(1    )# wo
h
> 0 (A.4)
and
Jj0j is the minor of J formed by removing from A its j0th row and jth column.
According to Routh-Horwitz theorem, the sign of the real parts of the roots of (A.1) depends
on the following Theorem:
Theorem 1 : The number of roots of (A.1) with positive real parts is equal to the number
of variations of sign in the scheme:
 1; TrJ;  B + DetJ

TrJ
; DetJ: (S)
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Proof. According to the Routh-Hurwitz criterion, the table of coe¢ cients associated to the
characteristic polynomial (A.1) reads:266664
 1  B 0
TrJ DetJ 0
 B + DetJTrJ 0
DetJ 0
377775
Thus, the number of eigenvalues with positive real parts is given by the number of sign changes
in the rst column. While the sign of the determinant of the matrix of coe¢ cients is positive,
the sign of the trace is ambiguous and depends on exogenous parameters. To apply the criterion,
we must know the sign of (A.2) as well as the sign of  B+ TrJDetJ . Using (A.3), (A.2) and (A.4)
to substitute for B, TrJ and DetJ yields:
 B + DetJ

TrJ
=
(1  )#+ h (1  ) w
h
+
(1    )# wo
h [  (1  )  wo] . (A.6)
The sign of TrJ depends on the size of interest rate, . If  > (1  )  wo, the trace of
the matrix of coe¢ cients is positive and the sign of (A.6) is unambiguously positive. If  <
(1  )  wo, the trace of the matrix of coe¢ cients is negative while the sign of (A.6) is ambiguous
and depends on the size of . More specically, the following table summarizes the number of
sign changes in scheme (S):
Restrictions -1 TrJ  B + TrJDetJ DetJ
 > (1  )  wo   + + +
 < (1  )  wo and (1  )  wo >  > ~     + +
 < (1  )  wo and (1  )  wo > ~ >        +
As is easy to check, the number of sign changes is always one, implying that the number of
eigenvalues with positive real parts is one.
Proof of Proposition 1: From (A.4), we know that the determinant of J is positive, which
is equal to saying that the product of the three eigenvalues is positive. This means that the
number of eigenvalues with positive real parts is either three or one. To have three eigenvalues
with positive real terms, there must be three changes of sign in scheme (S). However, Theorem
1 proves that the number of changes of sign in scheme (S) is always one, implying that J has
only one eigenvalue with positive real part. Since both the relative price of the installed capital,
q, and the immigration ratio, m, can jump instantaneously, while the stock of installed capital,
k, is constrained to adjust continuously, we conclude that the number of unstable roots is less
than the number of jump variables and that there exists a continuum of converging path to the
steady-state equilibrium (24)-(26), one for each possible initial condition for the jump variable
m.
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A.2 The equilibrium paths
The equilibrium paths: Once demonstrated that J has one unstable and two stable
eigenvalues, we are now ready to write down the time paths of the three endogenous variables,
k, q and m. Lets 1 > 0 denote the eigenvalue with positive root and 3 < 2 < 0 denote the
two eigenvalues with negative roots. The complete solution of system (21)-(23) can be written
as: 2664
k (t)
q (t)
m (t)
3775 =
2664
k
q
m
3775+B1
2664
1
v21
v31
3775 e1t +B2
2664
1
v22
v32
3775 e2t +B3
2664
1
v23
v33
3775 e3t;
where B1, B2 and B3 are arbitrary constants and the vector (1; v2!; v3!)
0 (where the prime
denotes vector transpose) is the normalized eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue !.
Transversality condition (11) implies B1 = 0. Thus, by taking t! 0 yields:2664
k (0)  k
q (0)  q
m (0) m
3775 = B2
2664
1
v22
v32
3775+B3
2664
1
v23
v33
3775 : (A.7)
The arbitrary constants B2, and B3, appearing in (A.7), are obtained from initial conditions.
Suppose the domestic economy starts out with a given initial stock of installed capital, k (0), and
with a given initial relative supply of immigrant labor, m (0). By solving for the two arbitrary
constant B2 and B3, and the initial condition, q (0), yields:
B2 =
(k (0)  k) v33   (m (0) m)
v33   v32
B3 =
(m (0) m)  (k (0)  k) v32
v33   v32
q (0) = q  

v33v22   v232
v33   v32

(k (0)  k) 

v32   v22
v33   v32

(m (0) m) .
Both the two arbitrary constants B2, and B3, and the initial relative price, q (0), depend
upon the specic shocks (k (0)  k), and (m (0) m), and the elements of the two eigenvectors
v2!, and v3!. Both v2! and v3! satisfy:0BBBB@
 ! 1h

A1 
#1  w
 1
1  
0
(1  )
h
#2(1 )  w1 
A1 
i 1
1  
  !  

#1  w1 
A
 1
1  
# 0   (1  ) w   !
1CCCCA
2664
1
v2!
v3!
3775 = 0,
with ! = f2; 3g.
By solving for v2! and v3! yields:
v2! = !h
 
A1 
#1  w
!  1
1  
> 0 ^ v3! = #
 (1  ) w + !
> 0.
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Consequently, the equilibrium paths of the three endogenous variables crucially depends on
m (0) and read:
k (t) = k +
h
(k(0) k)v33 (m(0) m)
v33 v32
i
e2t  
h
(m(0) m) (k(0) k)v32
v33 v32
i
e3t (A.8)
q (t) = q +
h
(k(0) k)v33 (m(0) m)
v33 v32
i
v22e
2t  
h
(m(0) m) (k(0) k)v32
v33 v32
i
v23e
3t (A.9)
m (t) = m +
h
(k(0) k)v33 (m(0) m)
v33 v32
i
v32e
2t  
h
(m(0) m) (k(0) k)v32
v33 v32
i
v33e
3t (A.10)
A.3 The steady-state dynamics of the current account
In this appendix we determine the equilibrium path of the current account. In doing so,
we follow Eicher and Turnovsky (1999) and restrict attention to the special case in which the
interest rate is stationary and equal to the subjective discount rate of natives, r = : By dividing
both sides of (19) by N yields:
_b (t) = b (k (t) ; q (t) ;m (t)) , (B.1)
where:
b (k (t) ; q (t) ;m (t))  b (t) + (1  )Ak (t)m (t)   c (0)  q (t)
2   1
2h
k (t) :
First-order Taylor expansion around the steady-state vector, fk; q;mg, gives:
_b (t) = b (k; q;m)+ @b(k
;q;m)
@k (k (t)  k)+ @b(k
;q;m)
@q (q (t)  q)+ @b(k
;q;m)
@m (m (t) m)
which can be rewritten as:
_b (t) = b (t) + (1  )A (k) (m)   c (0)  (q)2 12h kh
 (1  )A (k) 1 (m)   (q)2 12h
i
(k (t)  k)  (B.2)
  qkh (q (t)  q)   (   1)A (k) (m) 1 (m (t) m) .
By using time path (A.8), (A.9) and (A.10) to substitute for k (t), q (t) and m (t), equation
(B.2) becomes:
_b (t) = b (t) +  (k;m)  c (0) + 	 (0) e2t +(0) e3t.
where
 (k;m)  (1  )A (k) (m)   (q)2 12h k
	(0) 
h
(1  )A (k) 1 (m)

+ v32k

m

  (q)2 12h   q
kv22
h
i h
(k(0) k)v32 (m(0) m)
v33 v32
i
(0) 
h
(1  )A (k) 1 (m)

+ v33k

m

  (q)2 12h + q
kv23
h
i h
(m(0) m) (k(0) k)v32
v33 v32
i
.
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Starting from a given initial stock, b (0), the solution of (B.2) is:
b (t) = et

b (0) +
 (k;m)

+
	(0)
2   
+
(0)
3   
  c (0)


 
  (k
;m)

+
c (0)

+
	(0)
2   
e2t +
(0)
3   
e3t:
As  > 0, No-Ponzi scheme requires the following initial value for consumption:
c (0) = 

b (0) +
 (k;m)

+
	(0)
2   
+
(0)
3   

;
which in turn leads the following complete solution:
b (t) =

b (0) +
	 (0)
2   r
+
(0)
3   r

  	(0)
2   r
e2t   (0)
3   r
e3t.
Appendix B
B.1 Linearization of the dynamic system
This appendix provides the analytical details of the stability analysis as well as the for-
mal proof of Proposition 3. First-order Taylor expansion around the steady-state vector,
fk; q;m; b; cg, gives:0BBBBBBB@
_c
_k
_q
_m
_b
1CCCCCCCA
= J 
0BBBBBBB@
c  c
k   k
q   q
m m
b  b
1CCCCCCCA
:
The matrix of coe¢ cients, J , is given by:26666666666664
r+e


b
k

 1 
   e


b
k

cb
(k)2
0 0 e


b
k

c
k
0 q
 1
h    k

h 0 0
0   e


b
k

qz (1 )y
(k)2
a33   ykm e


b
k

q
k
0  y

k 0 
2 y
m    wo 0
1  2he


b
k

+(k)2[(q)2 1] 2h(1 ) y

k
2h(k)2
kq
h   (1  ) y

m a55
37777777777775
;
where:
y  A (k) (m)
a33  r + e

b
k

  1  q
   1
h
+ 
33
a55  r + e

b
k

1 + 
b
k

  1:
By using the steady-state conditions (41)-(45), the matrix of coe¢ cients can be rewritten
as follows:266666666666664
0   0 0 (1  r + )
0 0 1h

A1 
#1  w
 1
1  
0 0
0 [(1 )# (1+h)]
A1 
#1  w
  1
1  
  

w1 #1 
A
 
1   (1+h)(1 r+)
w#1 
A1 
  
1  
0 # 0   (1  ) w 0
1   [(1+
h
2 ) (1 )#]+ log(1 r+)

( 1+hh )
A1 
#1  w
  1
1  
  (1  ) w + 
377777777777775
where
  (1  r + ) log (1  r + )
  () 1



1 +
h
2

  (1  )#

 +  log (1  r + )

:
Given the complexity of the Jacobian, the local stability analysis is not feasible analytically.
Consequently, in we examine the local stability properties of the model numerically using the
parametrization provided by Table 2. Simulations are conducted by using Mathematica 5. The
results reported in Table B.1:
 1 2 3 3 3
0:00 0:1025  0:0641  0:0233 n.a. n.a.
0:05 0:3103  0:2771  0:0493  0:0225 0:0837
0:10 0:3535  0:3203  0:0496  0:0225 0:0840
0:15 0:3918  0:3587  0:0498  0:0225 0:0843
0:20 0:4265  0:3934  0:0499  0:0225 0:0844
0:25 0:1958  0:1619  0:0470  0:0224 0:0807
0:30 0:2597  0:2263  0:0487  0:0225 0:0829
Table B.1: Simulation results
34
References
[1] Barro, R. J. and X. Sala-i-Martin (2004). "Economic Growth, 2nd Edition," Cambridge,
MA, The MIT Press.
[2] Borjas, G. J. (1999). "Immigration and Welfare Magnets," Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(4), pages 607-37, October.
[3] Brainard,W. C., and J. Tobin (1968). "Pitfalls in Financial Model Building," American
Economic Review 58, pages 99122, May.
[4] Braun, J. (1993). Essays on Economic Growth and Migration. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University.
[5] Buiter, W. H. (1982). "Predetermined and non-predetermined variables in rational expec-
tations models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 10(1-2), pages 49-54.
[6] Chassamboulli, A. and T. Palivos (2010). "Give me your Tired, your Poor, so I can Prosper:
Immigration in Search Equilibrium," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics
12-2010, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
[7] Cooley, T. F. (1995), Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ.
[8] Eicher, T. S. and S. J. Turnovsky, (1999). "Non-Scale Models of Economic Growth," Eco-
nomic Journal 109, pages 394415.
[9] Galor, O. (1986). "Time preference and international labor migration," Journal of Economic
Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-20, February.
[10] Gollin, D. (2002). "Getting Income Shares Right," Journal of Political Economy, University
of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 458-474, April.
[11] Hayashi, F. (1982). "Tobins Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 213-24, January.
[12] Hazari, B. R. and P.M. Sgro (2003). "The simple analytics of optimal growth with illegal
migrants," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 141-151,
October.
[13] Inada, Ken-Ichi (1963) "On a Two-Sector Model of Economic Growth: Comments and a
Generalization," The Review of Economic Studies, 30(2): 119-127.
[14] Kemnitz, A. and B.U. Wigger (2000). "Growth and Social Security: The Role of Human
Capital," European Journal of Political Economy 16(4): 673-683.
[15] Liu, X. (2010). "On the macroeconomic and welfare e¤ects of illegal immigration," Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(12), pages 2547-2567, December.
35
[16] Meier, V. and Wenig A (1997). "Welfare Implications of International Labor Migration,"
Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 117(4): 505-524.
[17] Moy, H. M. and C. K. Yip (2006). "The simple analytics of optimal growth with illegal mi-
grants: A clarication," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(12),
pages 2469-2475, December.
[18] Ortigueira, S. and Santos, M.S. (1997). "On the Speed of Convergence in Endogenous
Growth Models," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3),
pages 383-99, June.
[19] Palivos, T. (2009). "Welfare e¤ects of illegal immigration," Journal of Population Eco-
nomics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 131-144, January.
[20] Palivos, T. and C. K. Yip (2007). "Illegal Immigration in a Heterogeneous Society," De-
partmental Working Papers No.188, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of
Economics.
[21] Palivos, T., J. Xue and C. K. Yip (2011). ""Illegal Immigration, Factor Substitution and
Economic Growth," Discussion Paper Series 2011/10, Department of Economics, University
of Macedonia.
[22] Rodriguez, C. A. (1975). "On the Welfare Aspects of International Migration," Journal of
Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(5), pages 1065-72, October.
[23] Turnovsky, S. J. (2005). "Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth in a Small Open
Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
[24] World Bank (2011). "Migration and Remittances Factbook". The World Bank, Washington
DC.
[25] Weder, M. (2001). "Indeterminacy in a Small Open Economy Ramsey Growth Model,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 339-356, June.
36
